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Abstract
This theoretical note aims at studying the role of reference points in generating
unemployment volatility. For this purpose, I introduce the notion of reference points
in a standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. I obtain two results. First, I find that the
obtained model is similar to the one found by Pissarides (2009). Second, I show that
the introduction of reference points can increase significantly unemployment volatility
through a mechanism à la Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008).
JEL Classification: J63, J64, C7.
Keywords: Reference points, Unemployment volatility, Job matching.
∗I would like to thank Jean Olivier Hairault, Pierrick Clerc, Nicolas Dromel and Antoine Lepetit for their help.
†Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics, vincent.boitier@univ-paris1.fr
1
1 Introduction
Empirical studies and laboratory experiments clearly show that reference points play a
fundamental role in (wage) negotiations (see, within a large literature, Kahneman and
Tversky (1978), Kahneman (1992) and Lewicki et al. (2010).) Indeed, it is demonstrated
that agents evaluate offers and outcomes as gains and losses relative to some reference
points. Therefore, by affecting preferences, these points impact both the process and the
outcome of bilateral bargaining. Moreover, a pervasive challenge in macroeconomics is to
understand why the standard Mortensen-Pissarides (hereafter MP) model cannot gener-
ate the volatility of the unemployment rate observed in US data. This is the so-called
Shimer puzzle. Several solutions have been proposed to solve this puzzle: wage stickiness
(Shimer (2004)), credible bargaining (Hall and Milgom (2008)), very high unemployment
benefits (Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008)), additional matching costs (Pissarides (2009))...
The aim of this theoretical note is to draw a link between reference points and the unem-
ployment volatility puzzle. For this purpose, I consider a simple MP model with exogenous
separations, reference points and where the partition of the surplus is no longer derived
by a Nash bargaining game. It is determined by a sequential bargaining game where the
outcome of this new negotiation process is evaluated relative to a reference point. By doing
so, I follow Compte and Jehiel (2003) and, more generally, the game theory literature (see
Muthoo (1999)). I then deduce the new wage equation and the new associated job creation.
I find that the obtained model is equivalent to the one found by Pissarides (2009). I also
show that the presence of reference points raise considerably the unemployment volatility
through a mechanism à la Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008). Indeed, I demonstrate that
reference points can lower firm’s profit and increase wage share by improving the outside
option of the worker. Thus, this short article adds reference points to the list of solutions
to the Shimer puzzle.
Notice finally that this is not the first framework that integrates reference dependence
in a MP model. In a recent working paper, Eliaz and Spiegler (2013) study the properties
of a dynamical model with search and matching frictions and with a reference point in
the productivity process of the firm. However, their model is quite different from the one
developed in this paper. Indeed, it features wage stickiness, it amplifies unemployment
volatility via a new mecanism independent from Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008) and it
does not aim at solving the Shimer puzzle.
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the search and matching model
with reference points. Section 3 concludes.
2
2 Search and matching model with reference points
The model considered hereafter is the standard Pissarides (2000) model with reference
points and sequential bargaining in line with Compte and Jehiel (2003).
2.1 Pissarides (2000) environment
Let U and W be the asset values of being unemployed and being employed. These asset
values are given by:
rU = z + f(θ)(W − U) (1)
and
rW = ω + s(U −W ) (2)
with r the risk-free interest rate, z the unemployment benefits, s the separation rate and
f(θ) the job finding rate. Let V and J be the asset values of a vacancy and a filled job.
These asset values are defined as:
rV = −c+ q(θ)(J − V ) (3)
and
rJ = p− ω − sJ (4)
with c the cost of a vacancy, p the productivity of workers, ω the wage and q(θ) the job
filling rate. Using equation (3), equation (4) and the free entry condition (i.e. V = 0), the
job creation equation is determined as:
p− ω
r + s
=
c
q(θ)
(5)
Furthermore, notice that the unemployment rate of the economy is given by the following
standard Beveridge curve:
u =
s
s+ f(θ)
(6)
2.2 The role of reference points
Once the match is made, employer and employee have to negotiate over the partition of the
surplus defined as S = W − U + J − V according to a sequential bargaining game. In the
first stage of the game, one player is randomly chosen to make a take-it or leave-it offer.
The probability for the worker and for the firm to be drawn is assumed to be equal. If the
offer is accepted by the opponent, the game ends. Conversely, if the offer is rejected, the
game goes on to the next period where a player is again randomly selected and bargaining
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begins again. If players agree on a partition of the surplus, they enjoy the following utility
function à la Compte and Jehiel (2003):1
ui(xi, φi) = xi − φi (7)
with i ∈ {W,F} and where W is the index of the worker such that xW = W − U , F
is the index of the firm such that xF = J − V and φi is the reference point of player i.
Equation (7) states that the utility of agents depends on the deviation of the value of the
agreement from the reference point. In line with prospect theory, this means that outcomes
are compared to a reference point that splits the agent preferences into gains and losses.
However, contrary to prospect theory and for the sake of simplicity, the valuation of gains
and losses are symmetric (i.e. no loss aversion).2 If players disagree forever, their payoffs
are equal to zero. Using Compte and Jehiel (2003), there exists a unique agreement given
by: 

xW = φW +
S−φW−φF
2
xF = φF +
S−φW−φF
2
(8)
if and only if φW + φF ≤ S. Otherwise (i.e. if φW + φF > S), I assume that no aggrement
exists. This standard result in the game theory literature is straighforward to analyse.3
Namely, this is the familiar split the difference rule: if demands are compatible (i.e. φW +
φF ≤ S), then an agreement is a situation where each agent gets the utility value of its
reference point and one-half of the remaining fraction of the surplus. Reducing system (8)
gives the following new sharing rule:
W − U − φW
2
=
J − V − φF
2
(9)
Using the above sharing rule, the wage satisfies:
ω = rU +
p− rU
2
+
(r + s)(φW − φF )
2
(10)
Likewise, using equation (1), the job creation equation and the sharing rule, I obtain:
rU = z + cθ + f(θ)(φW − φF ) (11)
Plugging equation (11) in equation (10) yields:
ω =
z + [r + s+ f(θ)]φW
2
+
p+ cθ − [r + s+ f(θ)]φF
2
(12)
1See Li (2007) and Hyndam (2011) for other utility functions similar to equation (7).
2It is possible to consider a general utility function such that ui(xi, φi) = f(xi − ηφi) where f could
exhibit loss aversion. Nonetheless, I assume a linear utility function in order to show that the Pissarides
(2009) model is a particular case of this general model.
3Indeed, this sharing rule could be derived from other frameworks: see, among others, Muthoo (1996),
Muthoo (1999, Corollary 2.2 and Corollary 4.1), Kambe (1999)...
4
Equation (12) shows that the worker’s reference point increases the wage by raising the
reservation wage while the firm’s reference point decreases the wage by lowering the ex-
pected return of the match. Moreover, observe that if reference points are equal (i.e.
φW = φF ), I end up with the standard wage equation derived from a symmetric Nash
bargaining game. Finally, the wage equation can be rewritten as:
ω = (1− β)z + β(p+ cθ) + [r + s+ f(θ)]H (13)
with β = 1
2
and where H = (1 − β)φW − βφF can be viewed as an index measuring the
relative importance of the worker’s reference point. Integrating equation (13) in equation
(5), I find:
p− (1− β)z − β(p+ cθ)− f(θ)H
r + s
=
c
q(θ)
+H (14)
Using the following job creation equation in Pissarides (2009):
p− ω′
r + s
=
c
q(θ)
+H ′ (15)
and the following wage equation in Pissarides (2009):
ω′ = (1− β′)z + β′(p+ cθ) + β′f(θ)H ′ (16)
yields the following job creation equation:
p− (1− β′)z − β′(p+ cθ)− β′f(θ)H ′
r + s
=
c
q(θ)
+H ′ (17)
with H ′ a constant and where 0 < β′ < 1. Notice that the Beveridge curve in Pissarides
(2009) is identical to the one in equation (6). Also observe that I can assume that H = H ′
since H and H ′ are exogenous parameters. Thus, up to a coefficient β′, the job creation
equation determined by a MP model with reference points is the same as the one determined
by a MP model with matching costs. This indicates that these two models generate the
same quantitative results. Indeed, I solve the job creation equation (14) for the unknown
θ with Pissarides (2009) calibration where β = β′ = 0.5. I then study the effect of a
1 % productivity shock on the model’s unknown by computing the elasticity ǫθ of the
tightness index with respect to productivity and the elasticity ǫω of the wage with respect
to productivity. Table 1 gives the results for different values of H.4 As in Pissarides
(2009), the model generates persistent high wage elasticities and an increase in H raises
4So far, there is no calibration for H because of lack of empirical evidence. This limit is in line with
Pissarides (2009) and the calibration of parameter H ′: "Since we do not have information about how the
job creation costs are split between the costs that depend on the duration of vacancies and the costs that do
not, we cannot choose one combination over another on the basis of independent evidence" in Pissarides
(2009, p.1375).
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H ǫω ǫθ
0.00 0.98 3.66
0.10 0.98 4.53
0.20 0.98 5.34
0.30 0.98 6.06
0.40 0.98 6.68
0.57 0.98 7.56
Table 1: Simulations results at different H
dramatically the volatility of job creation. Especially, the model is able to match the
observed volatility of labor market tightness (i.e. ǫ∗θ = 7.56). Since wage stickiness does
not matter here, the amplification mechanism is driven by the relative role of workers’
reference point. Indeed, for high H, the reference point of the worker is larger than the
reference point of the firm. This leads to an increase in the wage set by firms because the
reservation wage (or the outside option of the worker) is very high. This lowers the firm’s
surplus and so increases the effect of the productivity shock. Namely, the introduction of
reference points in a standard MP model can increase the unemployment volatility through
a mechanism à la Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008). Finally, contrary to Pissarides (2009)
where matching costs are always assumed to be exogenous, it is easy to endogenize reference
points in this setting. Indeed, in this stationary framework, a natural candidate for the
worker’s reference point is the partition of the surplus received by a worker in the standard
MP model. Assuming that the firm has no reference point and the reference point of the
worker is φW = 0.43, I obtain: H = 0.21. One can observe that even if the volatility is not
always matched, the introduction of endogenous reference points in a standard MP model
increases considerably the volatility generated by the model.
3 Conclusion
In this note, I integrate reference dependent preferences in the wage bargaining of the
benchmark MP model. I show that the obtained model is similar to the one of Pissarides
(2009). I also find that these reference points can generate unemployment volatility via a
mechanism à la Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008).
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